2011) by Etty, T.F.M.
efficiencies, and to provide this information to the COP-10 Bureau by 1 July
2012 and present a recommendation to COP-11 for its decision. In addition, the
executive secretary, along with the GM managing director, through regular or
special meetings based on the availability of extra-budgetary funds, was asked to
seek the views of parties and relevant actors on the work of the GM and to report
the views expressed to the COP.
In another decision, the COP acknowledged the need to speed up the align-
ment of the national action programs, SRAPs, and RAPs with the ten-year
strategy and urged affected country parties and regional implementation annexes
to intensify their efforts towards this alignment. The COP also, inter alia,
requested convention institutions to continue providing affected country parties
with the support they require to build institutional and technical capacity for the
effective alignment and implementation of the action programs, using the avail-
able resources, including the relevant technical assistance for the preparation,
revision, and alignment of SRAPs and RAPs.
Finally, a decision related to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (UNCSD), which is scheduled to take place in June 2012, requests
the executive secretary of the Desertification Convention to actively prepare for,
and participate in, the UNCSD. In addition, the budget decision holds the
Secretariat budget close to its existing level, at E16 million.
Lynn M. Wagner
doi:10.1093/yiel/yvs091
7. Biotechnology
Caveat
A caveat must be addressed at the start of this annual review of international
biotechnology law and policy. Due to technical problems experienced by the
publisher, fully beyond the author’s control, the report of developments during
2010 unfortunately was not published in last year’s volume of this Yearbook.
As a consequence, since the year 2010 saw some important milestones for
international biotechnology law and policy, the following report will cover
developments during both 2010 and 2011.
(1) Introduction
The year 2010 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the commercialization of
genetically modified (GM) crops. And the anniversary year was one of record
achievements, according to the annual Report on the Global Status of
Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops by the International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. In the first fifteen years since
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the first commercial transgenic plants were planted in 1996, the
worldwide-accumulated hectarage of GM crops has surpassed 1 billion hectares
(further growing to 1.25 billion hectares by 2011, which is equivalent to an area
25 percent larger than the total land mass of the United States or China). The
record number of 148 million hectares planted in 2010 (and almost 160 million
hectares in 2011) translates to an eighty-seven-fold increase over the premiere
season in 1996 (approximately 94-fold by 2011), and it was planted by a record
15.4 million farmers worldwide (almost 16.7 million in 2011). The number of
countries planting biotech crops has also reached an all-time high of twenty-nine
(which has nearly quintupled from the initial six in 1996), including Pakistan,
Myanmar, and Sweden as new participants, and Germany, which resumed GM
planting after a brief stop. Of the total twenty-nine GM-growing countries,
nineteen are developing nations. For the first time, in both 2010 and 2011, the
top ten countries each grew more than one million hectares, notably the United
States (2010: 66.8 million hectares; 2011: 69 million hectares), Brazil (2010:
25.4 million hectares; 2011: 30.3 million hectares), Argentina (2010: 22.9 mil-
lion hectares; 2011: 23.7 million hectares), India (2010: 9.4 million hectares;
2011: 10.6 million hectares), Canada (2010: 8.8 million hectares; 2011: 10.4
million hectares), China (2010: 3.5 million hectares; 2011: 3.9 million hectares),
Paraguay (2010: 2.6 million hectares; 2011: 2.8 million hectares), Pakistan
(2010: 2.4 million hectares; 2011: 2.6 million hectares), South Africa (2010:
2.2 million hectares; 2011: 2.3 million hectares), and Uruguay (2010: 1.1 million
hectares; 2011: 1.3 million hectares).
Despite this truly impressive global proliferation, genetically modified organ-
isms (GMOs) continue to represent a highly contentious and divisive issue, both
in public opinion, politics, and in legal terms. As always, both the nature of this
Yearbook as well as space limitations prevent a comprehensive overview of all
of the regional and national developments across the globe in this policy field.
Instead, this report will highlight the most crucial developments in the interna-
tional realm of ‘green’ biotechnology law in the years 2010 and 2011.
(2) Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol)
The Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the
main international instrument for biosafety regulation. Adopted at the turn of the
millennium, and entered into force in September 2003, the protocol had a
membership of 160 ratifying or accepting parties by the end of 2010, joined
by Morocco and Uruguay in 2011 and Bahrain in February 2012. The main
event in the context of the Cartagena Protocol on the agenda for 2010 and 2011
was the long-awaited supplementary protocol on liability and redress, during the
fifth Conference of the Parties (COP-5) to the COP Serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (COP/MOP-5), which took place
on 11-15 October 2008 in Nagoya, Japan (Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/
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17, 14 December 2010). This supplementary protocol is discussed in the
following section.
(A) Socio-Economic Impacts of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs)
(i) 2010
The COP/MOP requested the executive secretary to convene, prior to MOP-6 to the
Cartagena Protocol a regionally balanced workshop on capacity building for research
and information exchange on socio-economic impacts of LMOs. This workshop took
place on 14-16 November in New Delhi, India (see the meeting documents at
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=BSWS-SEC-01> for more information).
(ii) 2011
COP/MOP-5 to the Cartagena Protocol, in Decision BS-V/3, requested the
executive secretary to convene a regionally balanced workshop on capacity
building for research and information exchange on socio-economic impacts of
LMOs, with the following main objectives: (1) analysis of the capacity-building
activities, needs, and priorities regarding socio-economic considerations
submitted to the biosafety clearing-house by parties and other governments
and identification of options for co-operation in addressing those needs; (2)
exchange and analysis of information on the use of socio-economic consider-
ations in the context of Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol. This workshop
was held on 14-16 November in New Delhi, India (see the report and
all related documents at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/meetings/documents
.shtml?eventid=4742>).
(B) Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (NKLSPLR)
A liability and redress regime for damage caused by transboundary movements
of LMOs (as GMOs are referred to under the Cartagena Protocol) has long been
one of the key missing elements of the Cartagena Protocol. It is recalled that
when the Cartagena Protocol was being negotiated and signed in 2000 in
Montreal, the parties could not agree on more than a mandate (Article 27 of
the Cartagena Protocol) for future elaboration of rules and procedures on liabil-
ity and redress, with a decade-long deadline set to expire by 2009, at COP/
MOP-4. In the intervening years, the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group of
Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress in the Context of the
Protocol (WGLR) that was established to this end by COP/MOP-1 (Decision
BS-I/8) narrowed down many of the options, but it failed to produce a clear
consensus document for successful final negotiations at COP/MOP-4. Even a
last-ditch attempt to arrive at an agreement, convened shortly before the Bonn
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summit by the Dutch and Mexican co-chairs in the protocol’s birthplace of
Cartagena de Indias in Colombia, failed to produce the necessary consensus
for a decision within the original deadline. Instead, even just keeping the con-
tentious negotiations on track at all was the main task at hand during COP/
MOP-4. A new Friends of the Co-Chairs Group on Liability and Redress was
convened to work out a compromise (COP/MOP-4 Decision BS-IV/12), based
on the in-principle agreement of parties to work towards a legally binding
instrument focusing on an administrative approach to liability (allowing national
authorities to hold biotechnology operators responsible for damage caused by
LMOs), but also to include in this legally binding instrument one provision on
civil liability, to be supplemented by (non-legally binding) guidelines on civil
liability. The compromise basis was fragile, however, as negotiations proceeded
explicitly on a ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ basis.
The stakes were thus very high during the first months of 2010, with COP/
MOP-5 rapidly approaching. The liability and redress regime was considered
one of the main agenda items, and the parties were painfully aware of the
significance of this package for the effectiveness and credibility of the
Cartagena Protocol overall. Meanwhile, time was in short supply, and the dif-
ferences in positions were wide and deep, even on the most basic elements such
as the very nature of the instrument (that is, administrative, civil liability, or
‘dual approach).
Since the formal adoption of a legally binding instrument at COP/MOP-5 in
October 2010 would require ex ante the six-month circulation of a draft instru-
ment and the establishment of a legal drafting committee for the final text, the
new Friends of the Co-Chairs Group was convened for four meetings to prepare
a compromise text between February 2009 and early October 2010. The final
preparatory meeting was extended beyond the planned three days of negotiations
right up to the very start of COP/MOP-5 to iron out the final details and com-
promises. The major final point of contention was the question of whether LMOs
as well as ‘products thereof’ (for example, food and other derived products,
possibly including non-living transgenic material) should be included in the
definition of scope for the NKLSPLR. Arguing against such a wide definition,
several (biotech-producing) developed nations and stakeholders pointed out that
this point would exceed the scope of the parent Cartagena Protocol, from which
‘products of’ LMOs had been excluded after contentious negotiations one
decade ago. On the other hand, some delegations and stakeholders pointed out
that with respect to risk assessment provisions, the Cartagena Protocol does in
fact relate not only to LMOs but also to ‘products thereof.’
Another major remaining issue was the question of an enabling clause for
requiring operators to provide financial security. In particular, developing
nations were strongly in favour of a financial security clause to offset the
costs incurred by national competent authorities in the implementation of their
responsibilities under the NKLSPLR’s administrative approach. Moreover, the
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fact that the insurance industry thus far had explicitly declined to provide cover-
age for LMO-related damages, emphasized the need for public financial security
or compensation schemes. Interestingly, the biotechnology industry had begun
developing private financial security schemes, including the “Compact” initia-
tive, which is discussed later in this report.
The prolonged negotiations failed to fully resolve either issue, so that an
‘agree-to-disagree’ solution had to be found in the end in order to prevent
blocking the NKLSPLR’s adoption. In return for the removal of ‘products
thereof’ from the operative text of the protocol (Article 3), the report of the
meeting recorded an understanding that the parties may apply the protocol to
damage caused by LMO-derived products and processed materials of transgenic
origin, provided that a causal link is established between the damage and the
LMO in question. The financial security issue was resolved by allowing parties
to ‘retain the right to provide, in their domestic law, for financial security’
(qualified by the proviso ‘consistent with their rights and obligations under
international law’), paired with a commitment for the Secretariat to undertake
a comprehensive study into financial security mechanisms, and their environ-
mental, economic, and social impacts in particular on developing countries, to
enable the protocol’s COP-MOP to make a more informed decision on this issue
in the future (Article 10). Following these last-minute compromises, the draft
protocol’s text could be finalized, in the early morning of Monday, 11 October
2010, only hours before the start of COP/MOP-5.
Ultimately, on 15 October 2010, the parties at COP/MOP-5 successfully
adopted the NKLSPLR (Annex to Decision BS-V/11 on International Rules
and Procedures in the Field of Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting
from Transboundary Movements of Living Modified Organisms, online:
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/NKL_Protocol.shtml>), named after the two cities
where the final rounds of negotiations were held. One of the other key obser-
vations (and for some, criticisms) about the NKLSPLR is that it has not
delivered the (binding) civil liability regime that many had foreseen from the
(compromise) Article 27 created by the parties in 2000. Instead, the protocol
adopts an administrative approach, centred on oversight by competent national
authorities. With this, over a decade of strained negotiations about the legal
nature of the liability instrument has come to a definitive end, or at least
unless, for example, catastrophic events would alter parties’ fixed positions in
this regard.
The main proponents for a binding instrument on civil liability have been
most developing countries, particularly the African Group, Malaysia, India,
Colombia, as well as Norway. On the other end of the spectrum were Japan
and Brazil, which sought a non-binding approach so as to retain the national
autonomy to regulate LMO liability issues (although Brazil’s negotiating pos-
ition has often been quite ambiguous in this regard). An intermediate position
was taken by the European Community, Switzerland, and New Zealand, arguing
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for a dual approach involving a binding instrument on the administrative
approach and a non-binding civil liability instrument. Obviously, those
(mainly developed) countries that already have domestic civil liability provi-
sions in place that could address LMO damages are not inclined to agree to a
binding international instrument in the same sphere. The proponents of a binding
civil liability instrument, mostly developing countries, felt that this approach
was at the core of the mandate created by Article 27 in 2000. They argued that a
purely administrative approach, or possibly even a dual approach, would be a
betrayal of that ‘promise,’ if not a ‘moral obligation.’ Ultimately, however, they
ultimately conceited defeat on this point and accepted a dual approach that
combines a binding instrument on the administrative approach with an ‘enabling
clause’ on civil liability provisions.
Article 12 on Implementation and Relation to Civil Liability stipulates that
‘Parties shall provide, in their domestic law, for rules and procedures that ad-
dress damage. To implement this obligation, parties shall provide for response
measures in accordance with the NKLSPLR and may, as appropriate: (a) Apply
their existing domestic law, including, where applicable, general rules and
procedures on civil liability; (b) Apply or develop civil liability rules and
procedures specifically for this purpose; or (c) Apply or develop a combination
of both’ [emphasis added]. Evidently, the commanding language of ‘shall’ is
severely weakened by the addition of ‘may, as appropriate.’ Clearly, this
hard-fought political compromise has had very little legal meaning in practice,
as it merely reiterates the pre-existing general autonomy for states to adopt
domestic civil liability rules, while not adding any further obligation or com-
mitment. In fact, not even the previously proposed addition that ‘these rules may
be reviewed in due course with a view to making them binding in the light of
experience gained.’
Once a binding civil liability instrument proved unattainable in the prepara-
tory meetings, the proponents of a civil liability instrument—that is, most
developing countries and Norway—insisted on annexing specific ‘guidelines’
for the development of domestic civil liability provisions to the NKLSPLR and
including a clause about recognition of foreign judgments. In the course of the
negotiations, however, neither of these elements made their way in the final text
of the NKLSPLR, nor did the inclusion of ‘traditional damage’ in the definition
of LMO damage, meaning another major concession by developing countries.
Although the guidelines on civil liability were not adopted at this stage, Jimena
Nieto, as co-chair of the Group of Friends of the Co-Chairs on Liability and
Redress, recalled that ‘this does not preclude their potential elaboration at a later
stage.’ In addition, it deserves mention that in the broader environmental context
the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has now adopted its own Guidelines
for the Development of Legislation on Liability, Response Action and
Compensation for Damage Caused by Activities Dangerous to the
Environment (Doc. UNEP/GCSS.XI/11, 3 March 2010, online: <http://www
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.unep.org/gc/gcss-xi/docs/K1060433-Proceedings-reissued-set-of-options.
doc>). However, these guidelines are explicitly voluntary in nature and are not
intended to ‘set a precedent for the development of international law.’
The NKLSPLR has as its objective ‘to contribute to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human
health, by providing international rules and procedures in the field of liability
and redress relating to [LMOs]’ (Article 1). Although the preamble ‘reaffirms’
the precautionary approach contained in Rio Principle 15, precaution is notably
absent from the operational provisions of the NKLSPLR. This is notable since
the inclusion of precaution in the provisions, rather than merely the preamble, of
the parent Cartagena Protocol had been hailed as a major advancement of the
principle in international law. In the present liability and redress context, this
approach was apparently considered a bridge too far.
The NKLSPLR defines ‘damage’ as an adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity, taking into account risks to human health that are
measureable or otherwise
observable taking into account scientifically-established baselines recognized by a
competent authority that takes into account any other human-induced or natural
variation (Article 2(2)(b)). The adverse effects must also be ‘significant,’ which is to
be determined based on various factors, such as: the long-term permanent change that
will not be redressed through natural recovery within a reasonable period of time, the
extent of the qualitative or quantitative changes that adversely affect the components of
biological diversity, the reduction of the ability of components of biodiversity to
provide goods and services, and the extent of any adverse effects on human health
in the context of the BSP (Article 2(3)). In all cases, a causal link must be established
between the damage and the LMO in question, in accordance with domestic law.
(Article 4)
As discussed, the scope of the NKLSPLR is limited to damage caused by LMOs
(that is, not products thereof) that find their origin in a transboundary movement
and that were intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing; destined
for contained use; or intended for intentional introduction into the environment
(Article 3). An important temporal limitation applies: only damages resulting
from transboundary movements of LMOs that started after the entry into force of
the Nagoya Protocol shall be covered (Article 3(4)).
Moreover, damages occurring outside the limits of national jurisdiction
(for example, on the high seas or Antartica) are outside the scope of the protocol
(Article 3(5)). The fact that the NKLSPLR does not apply to issues of inter-state
liability and does not affect the rights and obligations of states under the rules of
general international law with respect to the responsibility of states for interna-
tionally wrongful acts (Article 11) is a major weakness, as this type of dispute
arguably lies at the very root of the LMO damage liability problem, particularly
given the administrative approach of the NKLSPLR. Generally, owing in large
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part to these jurisdictional limitations and in keeping with the administrative law
nature of the instrument, the legal impact of the NKLSPLR is weakened by the
scarce use of mandatory language and binding obligations. What is more, the
protocol explicitly authorizes parties to derogate from its provisions by provid-
ing in their domestic law for any exemptions or mitigations ‘as they deem fit’
(Article 6), setting time limits (Article 7), or capping the maximum recoverable
claim by setting specific financial limits (Article 8).
One of the few provisions that applies mandatory language (though still
leaving most implementation details to national discretion), and arguably the
‘beating heart’ of the NKLSPLR, is Article 5 on response measures. The
administrative approach of the protocol grants a key role to the competent
national authorities, making them responsible for monitoring LMO movements
and identifying responsible operators, evaluating threats and damages, taking
action in the event of (threatening) damage, and/or requiring operators to take
such response measures themselves (Article 5). Response measures may entail
reasonable actions to: prevent, minimize, contain, mitigate, or otherwise avoid
damage, as appropriate; restore biodiversity to the condition that existed before
the damage occurred, or its nearest equivalent, or replace the loss of biodiversity
with other components of biodiversity for the same, or for another type of use
either at the same, or as appropriate at another location (Article 2(2)(d)). The
application of civil liability standards to LMO damage is left entirely optional in
Article 12, though the reference to specific elements that states may provide
in their domestic civil liability laws is perceived by some (developing) nations as
an important international endorsement of the domestic liability standards they
might seek to apply.
The NKLSPLR will be open for signature at the UN headquarters from
7 March 2011 to 6 March 2012 and will enter into force upon ratification by
forty parties (Articles 17 and 18). Obviously, as with its parent treaty, the
NKLSPLR is unlikely to be signed by the major biotech-producing nations,
such as the United States and Canada. The CBD Secretariat will administer
the NKLSPLR, same as the Cartagena Protocol (Article 15). The Cartagena
Protocol’s COP/MOP will serve as the MOP of the NKLSPLR (Article 14),
which incidentally may lead to interesting situations if parties to the
Cartagena Protocol choose not to ratify the NKLSPLR.
In conclusion, the adoption of the NKLSPLR has been both hailed as a victory
and cursed as exemplary of the (legal) weakness of multilateral environmental
negotiations. International environmental liability instruments are notoriously
difficult to achieve. Indeed, the NKLSPLR is only the second liability instru-
ment to be concluded in the context of a multilateral environmental agreement,
after the 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation to the Basel
Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (Basel
Protocol). Notably, the Basel Protocol adopted a civil liability approach,
in particular in its definition of damage, unlike the NKLSPLR.
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And yet, clearly, in addition to the legal ambiguities and diplomatic com-
promise wording in the NKLSPLR, the practical impact of the liability and
redress provisions is weakened as a result of the omission of any concrete
framework or mechanisms for implementation, in Article 12 or elsewhere in
the protocol. Instead, the protocol’s implementation is left largely to the domes-
tic regulatory discretion of the parties, and cross-border issues are left entirely
unregulated. Obviously, as always, these concessions were necessary to avoid a
complete breakdown of the negotiation process as well as to facilitate ratifica-
tions, but skeptics may question whether a weak and toothless liability regime is
truly better than none at all. Perhaps its application in diplomatic and/or legal
(judiciary) practice may add strength to the NKLSPLR’s principles.
(C) Status of Signature and Ratification of the NKLSPLR
The NKLSPLR was opened for signature at the UN headquarters in New York
for one full year between 7 March 2011 and 6 March 2012. A total of fifty-one
states signed the protocol (thirty-seven in 2011, fourteen in 2012). Latvia was
the only party to ratify the NKLSPLR in 2011, joined by the Czech Republic in
February 2012. Another thirty-eight instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession are required for the protocol to enter into force.
Throughout the year, the CBD Secretariat has undertaken various initiatives,
including regional workshops, to promote awareness and understanding of the
provisions of the NKLSPLR, with a view to facilitating its signature and
ratification and to achieve a timely entry into force.
(D) Compact: Contractual Mechanism for Response in the Event of Damage
to Biological Diversity Caused by the Release of a LMO
As discussed in previous reports on biotechnology in this Yearbook, an alliance
of the global biotech industry launched a private initiative on LMO-damage
claims arbitration in 2009, alongside (or, rather, as an alternative to) the multi-
lateral negotiations for a liability and redress protocol. The ‘Compact’ proposal
entails a Contractual Mechanism for Response in the Event of Damage to
Biological Diversity Caused by the Release of a Living Modified Organism,
which was initiated by the world’s six leading agri-biotechnology companies:
Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, Bayer CropSciences, and Dow
Agrosciences, jointly represented by CropLife International, the global feder-
ation of the plant science industry (all Compact-related documents are online:
<http://www.biodiversitycompact.org>).
The Compact proposal was first presented at the last-minute Friends of the
Co-Chairs Group Cartagena meeting in March 2008, in the run up to the Bonn
COP/MOP-4 summit, as an alternative to the multilateral negotiations that were
threatening to break down. In fact, it was suggested that the biotech industry
might withdraw the Compact proposal if the parties at COP/MOP-4 would not
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support this initiative as an alternative to the negotiations for a multilateral
protocol. However, a revised version of the Compact was presented at the
February 2009 meeting of the reconvened Friends of the Co-Chairs Group,
accompanied by the offer that industry representatives were willing to discuss
the document with delegates.
Although efforts to integrate the Compact into the negotiation process failed,
the Compact was signed and became operational in May 2010, prior to the
adoption of the NKLSPLR. At COP/MOP-5 in Nagoya, Japan, CropLife
International hosted a side event on 12 October 2010 to celebrate the implemen-
tation of the Compact. It is clear that the industry initiative has played a key role
in shaping and perhaps even enabling the adoption of the NKLSPLR.
The Compact is a binding contractual agreement among its corporate mem-
bers to provide recourse for so-called ‘actual’ damage to biological diversity if
their products are the cause. The Compact does not provide cover for traditional
tort law damages, such as personal injury or property damage. Under this agree-
ment, any UN state may file a claim for damages by showing that an LMO
produced by a member of the Compact group caused ‘measurable, significant
and adverse change to a species or ecosystem’ in that country. States become
‘third party beneficiaries’ under the Compact if they consent to its standards and
regulations and if their claim is accepted by the special arbitration tribunal set up
by the industry group, under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA). The Compact initiative has triggered a diversity of responses from both
national delegations as well as civil society observers. Many have criticized the
industry initiative as an attempt to redefine the roles of states and corporations
by unilaterally formulating the terms, conditions, and administration of global
liability for LMO damages. In substantive terms, the main criticisms target the
exemption of coverage for damages caused by LMOs in activities that were
authorized and risk assessed following the procedures of the Cartagena
Protocol (ruling out recourse to the precautionary principle, as in the
Cartagena Protocol itself); the closed and confidential nature of claims and
procedures; the high standard and burden of proof for claimants and the defin-
ition of ‘damage’ (the standard being ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ and proof
that the damage ‘would not have occurred but for the LMO release,’ both more-
over linked to a requisite twenty-five years of baseline data on biodiversity to
substantiate claims for damages); the low financial limits offered and the exclu-
sion of traditional damages (for example, claims by farmers for lost profits or
additional costs incurred) paired with the exclusion of double recovery (that is, a
claim under the compact would rule out any parallel or subsequent civil or
administrative claims for the same incident causing damages, and Compact
claims will be inadmissible insofar as such other litigations have previously or
concurrently been initiated).
Experiences in the coming years will have to show the relative impact and
effectiveness of both the NKLSPLR and the industry Compact initiative. The
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industry Compact partners will, of course, endeavour to play a key role in
guiding the implementation guidelines for the newly agreed NKLSPLR, in
order to co-ordinate and streamline the protocol and implement national legis-
lation with their own Compact provisions. Once the initial rush of successful
completion wears off, the ratification and subsequent implementation processes
of the NKLSPLR may be expected to present significant challenges in the
coming years.
(E) Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention of Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol)
Although not technically within the scope of this annual overview of develop-
ments in international biotechnology and biosafety policy and law, it is relevant
to note that in addition to the NKLSPLR, another important protocol was
adopted during 2010 in the CBD context. On 29 October, the parties of the
CBD at their COP-10 in Nagoya, Japan, adopted the Nagoya Protocol. For an
extensive discussion of this new protocol, readers are referred to the contribution
by Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani in last year’s volume of this Yearbook.
The Nagoya Protocol was opened for signature at UN headquarters in New
York from 2 February 2011 to 1 February 2012, and was signed by ninety-two
parties during this time. During 2011, Gabon was the only signatory to ratify
the protocol, meaning that another forty-nine instruments of ratification, accept-
ance, approval, or accession will be required for its entry into force. In order to
facilitate and expedite this process, particularly with a view towards the special
needs of developing countries, a dedicated trust fund has been set up for the
protocol by the Global Environment Facility in May 2011, with the CBD
Secretariat serving as the operator of the fund. The fund was proposed by the
government of Japan, having been the host of the Nagoya meeting that produced
both these historic protocols and the key contributor to the implementation
funding of the protocol.
(3) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and Public Participation
(Aarhus Convention) in GMO Decision Making
During 2010 and 2011, there were no noteworthy developments in regard to
public participation in GMO decision making in the context of the Aarhus
Convention. Public participation in GMO decision making has been an issue
of debate under the Aarhus Convention since its inception, resulting in May
2005 in the adoption of the so-called Almaty GMO Amendment to the conven-
tion by MOP-2, with the objective of strengthening the rights of the public to
participate in decision making on GMOs (Decision II/1, Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2005/
2, 12 July 2005).
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However, unless and until a sufficient number of instruments of ratification or
acceptance are deposited by the parties to the amendment, this major political
breakthrough remains devoid of practical consequences for citizens and civil
society. During the two-year period currently under review, the requirement for
entry into force of ratification by three-quarters of the parties again remained
unmet. During 2010, the number of ratifying parties had only marginally grown
from twenty-five to twenty-six, with only Slovenia joining, whereas in 2011
there were no instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval filed at all.
This still leaves it another two parties short of the critical mass required for its
entry into force. Evidently, even then the Almaty GMO Amendment will only be
binding upon those parties that have ratified it. In the interim, just as before the
amendment was adopted, the pre-existing non-binding GMO guidelines will
continue to apply as a voluntary instrument.
In October 2010, in the week preceding the Cartagena Protocol’s COP/MOP-5
in Nagoya, Japan, a joint workshop on public awareness, access to information,
and public participation regarding LMOs/GMOs was organized in partnership
with the Secretariats of the Cartagena Protocol and the Aarhus Convention. The
main purpose of the meeting was to enable participants (a total of fifty, from
nineteen states, three international/regional organizations, and eighteen
non-governmental organizations) in both multilateral environmental agreements
to share experiences, best practices, and common challenges in promoting public
awareness, access to information, and participation in decision making concern-
ing LMOs/GMOs. The workshop produced a number of recommendations,
including proposals to facilitate implementation of the Cartagena Protocol’s
program of work on public awareness, education, and participation and the
Aarhus Convention’s 2005 Almaty GMO Amendment and the 2003 Lucca
GMO Guidelines. Based on the positive outcome of this workshop, it was
decided that more such joint workshops and meetings should be organized in
the future and that collaboration should be enhanced between the two
Secretariats, in particular with respect to their respective clearing-house mech-
anisms (full information and documentation for the workshop are available at
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/gmo.htm>).
(4) Codex Alimentarius
(A) GM Food Labelling
Standards for the labelling of GM foods and derived foodstuffs have proved a
very contentious and sticky subject within the Codex Alimentarius over the
years. Despite having topped the agenda of the Codex Committee on Food
Labelling (CCFL) for well over a decade, only marginally substantive progress
has been achieved thus far. Though in formal terms this stalemate was broken in
the two-year period under review, the end result was rather marginal. Of the two
documents at issue, the most contentious are the proposed draft Guidelines for
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the Labelling of Foods and Food Ingredients Obtained through Certain
Techniques of Genetic Modification/Genetic Engineering: Labelling
Provisions (Doc. ALINORM 04/27/22, Appendix VI), as this concerns the
actual draft labelling provisions for GM foods. The second document is intended
to provide definitions simply as a background to these labelling provisions, in
the draft Recommendations for the Labelling of Foods Obtained through Certain
Techniques of Genetic Modification/Genetic Engineering (Draft Amendment to
the General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods): Definitions
(Doc. ALINORM 04/27/22, Appendix VI).
Delegations are divided, mainly, on the question of whether the GM labelling
provisions should convey only information relating to human health and safety
concerns (triggered by changes in nutrient content, product composition, and/or
final use) or also information reflecting the production method per se, so as to
(principally) identify the application of biotechnology in the production process
even if the final product bears little or no sign of this. Whether the Codex
Alimentarius mandate should include such a general ‘consumer right to know’
is a matter of fierce disagreement among delegations. One reason why these
standards are of great practical significance, and therefore subject to contention,
is that many (developing) countries base their domestic policies and regulations
on Codex Alimentarius recommendations.
Both documents have remained quite immobile in the Codex standard-setting
procedure. The draft definitions amendment has hovered at the second last step
(seven of eight) for years, whereas the draft guidelines have in fact been moving
backward in the process (to step three of eight). In 2009, the CCFL’s effort to
break the political stalemate, by replacing the text of the proposed draft ‘guide-
lines’ with a new text entitled ‘Recommendations’ that reflect existing Codex
provisions and merely present principles or concepts to be taken into consider-
ation by those countries willing to develop and implement rules on GM food
labelling (Doc. ALINORM 08/31/22, paras. 75-93, and Appendix VII), failed to
inspire progress—so much so, in fact, that several delegations suggested aban-
doning the work altogether, though these calls ultimately did not find majority
support. A complicating factor specifically in terms of the draft definitions
amendment was that the finalization of these definitions was previously made
dependent on the finalization of the draft guidelines, which had now been
revoked and replaced with draft recommendations. Thus, several delegations
argued that work on the definitions should be discontinued as they were
linked to a paper that was no longer under discussion. Others argued that the
definitions continue to be a necessary amendment to the General Standard for
the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods (Doc. CODEX STAN 1-1985) because
4.2.2 of the General Standard refers to ‘food or food ingredients obtained
through biotechnology,’ without defining these terms. Ultimately, the draft def-
initions amendment was, once again, retained at Step 7 (Doc. ALINORM 09/32/
22, pp. 11-12). In turn, the draft recommendations (formerly guidelines)
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received insufficient support to advance in the decision-making ladder and were
retained at Step 3 for comments and consideration at the next session (Doc.
ALINORM 09/32/22, pp. 11-12, and Appendix VII).
During May 2010, at the CCFL’s thirty-eighth session, convened in Quebec
City, Canada, once again very little progress was made. The draft definitions
were returned from Step 7 to 6, for comments and consideration at the next
session (Doc. ALINORM 10/33/22, pp. 12-13, and Appendix IX). For the draft
recommendations, discontinuation was once again put forward, but ultimately
rejected. The ensuing discussions centred on two options for a ‘chapeau text,’ in
amended versions drafted by Brazil and the United States. Differences of
opinion were mainly on two sentences. The sentence: ‘It also recognizes that
each country can adopt different approaches regarding labelling of foods
obtained by GM/GE techniques and that food labelling is the primary means
of communications between the seller on the one hand and the purchaser and
consumer on the other,’ as contained in the Brazil text was considered by some
as being too permissive by allowing various approaches and by others as not
being necessary as Codex texts are voluntary. Other delegations noted that simi-
lar statements are found in some Codex texts. The sentence: ‘This document is
not intended to suggest or imply that GM/GE foods are in any way different
from other foods simply due to their method of production,’ which is contained
in the US proposal, was not supported by many delegations that were of the view
that there was a difference between foods obtained by GM/GE methods and
other foods, since the Codex had created a task force that developed a number of
guidelines for the risk assessment of such foods. In the end, the chair’s proposal
for an amended chapeau text, along with an alternative version, was decided
to be circulated at Step 3 for comments and consideration at the next session
(Doc. ALINORM 10/33/22, pp. 13-15, and Appendix X).
When the CCFL’s reconvened for its thirty-ninth session, in Quebec in May
2011, the long-lingering decision in regard to the definitions was ultimately
made to discontinue work on the Draft Amendment to the General Standard
for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods: Definitions (Doc. REP11/FL, para. 124;
REP11/CAC, Appendix VII), for separate inclusion in the general standard,
opting instead to make a reference to the Principles for the Risk Analysis of
Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology (Doc. CAC/GL 44-2003) in a foot-
note to the title of the proposed draft Recommendations for the Labelling of
Foods and Food Ingredients Obtained through Certain Techniques of Genetic
Modification/Genetic Engineering (Doc. ALINORM 10/33/22, Appendix X).
The latter was recast and simplified as the Proposed Draft Compilation of
Codex Texts Relevant to Labelling of Foods Derived from Modern
Biotechnology and adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), at
its thirty-fourth session in July 2011, and finally adopted as a stand-alone docu-
ment at Steps 5/8 (Doc. REP11/FL, para. 156, Appendix III; REP11CAC,
para. 82).
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After many years of stalemate, the labelling standard was thus finally
adopted, though in a rather marginalized form as compared to the original pro-
posals. Its sole purpose is ‘only to recall and assemble in a single document
some important elements of guidance from Codex texts, which are relevant to
labelling of foods derived from modern biotechnology,’ while the sentence
added by the United States was ultimately included to state that ‘[t]his document
is not intended to suggest or imply that foods derived from modern biotechnol-
ogy are necessarily different from other foods simply due to their method
of production.’
(B) Detection and Identification of GM Foods
The practical effectiveness of food labelling provisions obviously hinge on the
underlying ability to detect and identify GM traces in food products and ingre-
dients. With a view to this ability, the Codex Committee on Methods of Analysis
and Sampling (CCMAS) has for years been preparing Criteria for the Detection
and Identification of Foods Derived from Biotechnology (Doc. CX/MAS
05/26/9). Although in recent years, the need for such standards and methods
within the Codex Alimentarius context have been questioned, last year the
CCMAS was given a renewed, expanded mandate in this area (beyond just
GMO-derived foods) by the CAC at its thirty-first session in July 2008 (Doc.
ALINORM 08/31/REP, paras. 94-97). In March 2010, at its thirty-first session,
in Budapest, Hungary, the CCMAS made headway on this dossier, now that the
scope had been widened beyond the biotechnology context. After extensive
discussion, a new title and text was agreed for the draft document, noting that
there was no need to place specific emphasis on foods derived from modern
biotechnology, albeit with the addition of a footnote with the title, reading ‘for
applications such as food derived from modern biotechnology, food authentica-
tion, food speciation and other purposes.’ The revised and retitled document
Proposed Draft Guidelines on Performance Criteria and Validation of Methods
for Detection, Identification and Quantification of Specific DNA Sequences and
Specific Proteins in Foods, was adopted by the thirty-third CAC session at Step
5/8, following the CCMAS recommendation to omit Steps 6 and 7
(Doc. ALINORM 10/33/23, pp. 2-5 and Appendix III).
Thijs F.M. Etty
doi:10.1093/yiel/yvs100
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